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NOTES
ling state interest to preserve life. Nor is it clear whether such a compelling
state interest will prevail in every case.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Kennedy Hospital the court seemed to place a great deal of emphasis upon
the fact that the hospital was an "involuntary custodian" of the patient and
that, as such, the hospital and its staff should be allowed to act to save lives. '
But it reserved judgment in the situation in which a patient who is completely
competent and capable of making decisions on his own behalf is voluntarily
admitted to a hospital, but refuses to submit to a blood transfusion because of
religious beliefs. If the court were to follow the precedent established by In re
Brooks' Estate43 and Erickson v. Dilgard," it would seem that the court would
allow the patient to make his own decision with regard to the blood transfusion.
However, the court pointed out that no one has a constitutional right to die, reli-
giously based or not,' and such a view casts doubt as to whether the court
would follow these decisions. It will be interesting to see if other courts in
similar cases will consider whether the state has a sufficient interest in the
sustenance of life such that the presence of this interest alone will justify inter-
ference with the free exercise of religious liberty.
Donald H. Snell
Equal Protection and the Closing of Public Facilities:
Palmer v. Thompson
One year after a federal district court declared that the segregated operation
of public swimming pools in Jackson, Mississippi, denied its citizens equal pro-
tection of the laws,1 the city closed its pools. At least one of the pools was sub-
sequently disposed of such that it continued to be operated on a segregated
basis.' A number of Negro citizens of Jackson filed suit to compel the city to
reopen the pools and operate them on a desegregated basis.3 The federal district
court found that the closing of the pools did not deny the plaintiffs equal pro-
tection of the laws.4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.' Held affirmed: The closing of
previously segregated public recreational facilities by a city does not deny its
" 279 A.2d at 673.
43205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
"252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
42279 A.2d at 672.
'Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962). The plaintiffs obtained a
declaratory judgment, but the court did not grant injunctive relief.
'The city cancelled its lease on one pool, which the Y.M.C.A. subsequently reopened
to white persons only. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
'The suit was predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970).
'The opinion of the district court was not reported.
5419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969). The court sat en banc, and six out of the thirteen
circuit judges dissented.
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citizens equal protection of the laws. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971).
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AS A BARRIER AGAINST RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY STATE ACTION IN THE USE AND
ENJOYMENT OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
Since its earliest interpretations of the post-Civil War amendments,' the
United States Supreme Court has sought to prevent arbitrarily discriminatory
official conduct. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' was
interpreted to prohibit such action as early as 1914.8 The standard traditionally
used by the Court in applying the equal protection clause is one of reasonable-
ness. Thus, when a state furthers or maintains a policy of discrimination, that
standard is met if such discrimination bears a reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate legislative end."
In recent years the Court has employed a stricter standard when a state's dis-
criminatory policies are based on suspect criteria, such as race,"0 or when the
classification hampers the exercise of some fundamental right, such as the right
to vote." When one or both of these factors are present, the classification must
not merely meet the standard of reasonableness, but there must be a compelling
state interest in maintaining the policy."
For many years the Court countenanced racial discrimination in the use and
enjoyment of any given public facility so long as "separate but equal" facilities
were provided for both races." However, in Brown v. Board of Education4 the
Court overruled all of its earlier decisions under the "separate but equal facili-
ties" standard and held that since race was not a rational basis for classification,
racial segregation of public facilities was presumptively violative of the equal
protection clause. The rationale for this decision was that separate facilities are
inherently unequal."
Though Brown was applicable to segregated public schools, this same princi-
ple of inherent inequality was soon applied to public facilities of all types."
6 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
7 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
'McCabe v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
"See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
"See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"When suspect criteria or fundamental rights are not at issue, there exists a presumption
of constitutionality. Such a presumption operates heavily in favor of the state. See, e.g.,
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). But the imposition of the com-
pelling state interest standard has the effect of placing a very onerous burden upon the state
to demonstrate the necessity of maintaining a policy of discrimination. Thus, as a practical
matter a state may seldom justify a policy that discriminates on the basis of race. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
" The "separate but equal" standard was first announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
14347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1" Id. at 495.
"Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, afl'g per curiam 220
F.2d 386 (4th Cit. 1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879, vacating per curiain 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cit. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Browder
v. Gale, 352 U.S. 903, afJ'g per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (public trans-
portation); Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm'n, 359 U.S. 533 (1959), aff'g per curiam 168
NOTES
Initially the Court permitted a program of gradual desegregation. More recent-
ly, however, the Court held that delays in integration were no longer tolerable."
Since race is a suspect criterion, and since the "separate but equal" standard is
no longer defensible in view of Brown and its progeny, it follows that a state
may not maintain a segregated public facility in the absence of a compelling
state interest.
II. THE CLOSING OF PUBLIC FACILITIES: THE MOTIVATION AND
PRACTICAL EFFECT
The courts have indicated that under certain circumstances the closing of
public facilities may amount to state-sanctioned segregation. Hence, a closing
by a state of certain public facilities may violate the equal protection clause.
The decisions that have enjoined such closings have been predicated upon the
motivation behind the closing and upon the effect of the closing.
Motivation. Motivation was a key issue in Griffin v. County School Board."
There all the public schools in a single county were closed. Consequently, stu-
dents in that county attended private schools which were partially supported by
public funds.1" The Supreme Court found that the sole purpose of the closing
was to insure that white and Negro children would not attend the same schools.
Thus, the county's policy was nothing more than a ruse designed to sidestep
impending desegregation orders. Hence, the scheme violated the right of the
county's Negro citizens to equal protection of the laws. The Court ordered the
reopening of the public schools on an integrated basis. Motivation was also at
issue in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board." There the Louisiana Legislature
authorized the Governor to close any public school ordered to be integrated.
The district court found that the enactment of the statute granting such power
was motivated solely by an attempt to avoid desegregation of the public schools.
The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.21 The Court evidently concurred
with the district court's conclusion that the motivation for the state's action was
grounds for declaring the law unconstitutional."
In Wright v. City of BrightonW2 a suit was initiated to enjoin the city from
leasing a building to a private segregated school. After the court indicated at a
preliminary hearing that a lease by the city to a private segregated school would
probably be invalid, the city sold the building to the school. The district court
held that the sale did not violate any rights of the Negro plaintiffs and denied
relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the sale of the building to a
F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (stadiums and theaters); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963) (per curiam) (public office buildings).
"7Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
18377 U.S. 218 (1964).
29 All the public schools in Virginia except those in that single county remained open. Id.
at 223.
0 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960).
2'365 U.S. 569 (1960).
2 The district court relied on Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). Motivation and
purpose must be determined irrespective of the terms of a statute or any other official act.
Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end,
particularly when that end is racial discrimination.
441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. fled sub nom. Hoover Academy v.
Wright, 40 U.S.L.W. 3080 (U.S. Aug. 2, 1971) (No. 71-212).
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private school so that the school would remain segregated was not done in good
faith and, thus, was violative of the plaintiffs' right to equal protection. The de-
cision in Wright considered motivation important in determining whether a
constitutional right had been violated as a result of the city's sale to private
parties.'
Therefore, the holdings in Griffin, Bush, and Wright exemplify the signifi-
cance attached by the courts to the motivation behind the closing of a public
facility. These opinions imply that the closing of a public facility to avoid de-
segregation may, in itself, constitute a denial of the right to equal protection
with regard to those citizens who are deprived of the use of such a facility on a
desegregated basis.
Effect. Aside from the motivation behind the closing of public facilities, the
courts also consider the ultimate effect of the closing in determining whether
such action violates a citizen's right to equal protection. In Griffin the Supreme
Court found that the school closings placed Negro children at a disadvantage
because white children had private schools to attend, while Negro children had
no such facilities available to them. ' Hence, the language of Grifflin indicates
the Court's concern with the effect of the closing.
The opinion in Bush also addressed itself to the ultimate effect of the Louisi-
ana statute that authorized the closing of public schools. The court found that
the effect of the closings in Bush was a patent violation of the equal protection
clause and that this effect rendered the statute unconstitutional. " Wright also
suggested that the effect of closing a public facility was not to be overlooked.
In that case the court's opinion exemplified the necessity of assessing the poten-
tial impact of the state action in determining whether the state involved itself
in invidious discrimination. 7 The court concluded that since the effect of the
city's action was to encourage maintenance of a segregated facility the action
was unconstitutional.
28
Although the courts have considered both the motivation and effect of a
closing, these cases do not reveal whether a finding of invidiously discriminatory
motivation alone will warrant relief. Neither do they show whether discrimina-
tory effect, absent some showing of bad faith, will suffice as a ground for not
allowing a state to close a public facility.
24The opinion in Wright cites Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), for the propo-
sition that legislation that is apparently neutral may be unconstitutional if its motivation
was to avoid racial desegregation. The holding implies that even the minimal requirement
of reasonableness-some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative end---cannot be
satisfied when the motivation behind a state's policy is the perpetuation of segregation of
the races, an obviously illegitimate end.
377 U.S. at 230.
187 F. Supp. at 43.
27441 F.2d 447 (1971). The court relied upon Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380
(1967), and applied the Court's holding in that case to the lease and sale arrangement in
Wright. The selling by the city of a public school building to an institution which they
knew would operate an all-white segregated school had the ultimate effect of placing a spe-
cial burden on black citizens.
2441 F.2d at 451. The court also discussed an earlier related case, Derrington v. Plum-
mer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956). Derrington indicated that racial discrimination on the
part of the state's private lessee constituted state action. However, Derrington also indicated
that a county might, in good faith, sell and dispose of its surplus property such that any sub-
sequent racial discrimination in the use of the property would not be state action. The opin-
ion in Wright casts serious doubt upon the validity of the sale-lease distinction.
[Vol. 2 5
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III. PALMER V. THOMPSON
Palmer v. Thompson29 raises the issue of whether a city can close its munici-
pal recreational facilities in order to avoid a desegregation order. Palmer also
raises the issue of whether a city can close a public recreational facility if such
action has the practical effect of placing a particular racial group at a disad-
vantage. Hence, questions of motivation and of effect were both before the
Court.
The plaintiffs in Palmer contended that the closing violated their fourteenth
amendment rights because the motivation for the closing was the avoidance
of desegregation orders. The Court dismissed the motivation behind the city's
action as a valid criterion for determining the constitutionality of the closings.
In fact, motivation was characterized as judicially indeterminable and difficult
to apply even if determined. Thus, whether the closing was an attempt to avoid
desegregation orders became irrelevant. The Court then passed on to the effect
of the closings on the Negro citizens of Jackson.
The plaintiffs alleged that the closing of the city's public swimming pools
had the practical effect of denying the use of such facilities to Negroes only,
because the closing left whites with several private pools open to them, while
Negro citizens were altogether without such facilities.' The Court candidly
conceded that the Negro citizens of Jackson were placed at a disadvantage by
the closing. Whether this disadvantage was constitutionally proscribed then
became the primary question before the Court.
Shifting the emphasis from motivation to effect, the Court clarified Griffin
v. County School Board1 as a case turning on the unequal effect engendered by
the closing of schools. The effect of the closing in Griffin was that white child-
ren had accredited private schools that they could attend, while Negro children
had no available private schools. The majority found Palmer to be analogous in
that the closing of the public pools had the practical effect of closing all swim-
ming facilities to Negroes, while leaving private facilities available to whites.
Another similarity noted by the Court was that in both cases the public facili-
ties were closed after orders to integrate had been issued." Nevertheless, the
majority in Palmer found Griffin to be distinguishable. In Griffin the facts re-
vealed an elaborate scheme on the part of the county to run the schools "pri-
vately" following the closing. In Palmer the City had completely ceased to
operate the swimming pools. Thus, the Negro citizens of Jackson, unlike the
2U403 U.S. 217 (1971).
3 One of the pools formerly run by the city was leased, not owned. After the closings
this pool was returned to its owner, the Y.M.C.A., which operated it on a segregated basis.
This raises the question of whether the closing of the leased pool and its return to the lessor,
which then operated it on a segregated basis, was unconstitutional state action. A lease by
a city from private persons is patently distinguishable from a lease to private persons. The
latter situation has been held to constitute unlawful state involvement in invidious discrimi-
nation. See Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956). Cf. Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966), in which a city was held responsible for racial discrimination by pri-
vate citizens who excluded Negroes from a private park after the city had turned the park's
administration over to private control. See also Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1968); City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cit. 1957).
31377 U.S. 218 (1964).
, The similarity suggests that the same motivation, the avoidance of desegregation orders,
was present in both cases. However, the purpose for which a public facility is closed is,
under the Court's own standards, not determinative. Id. at 226.
1971]
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citizens of Prince Edward County, could not demonstrate that the city was in-
volved in the funding of those public facilities, which had been relinquished to
the control of private concerns.'
The essence of the Court's opinion in Palmer is that the effect of the closing
of a public facility, rather than the motivation for the closing, is controlling.
However, in order to distinguish Griffin, a case in which the decision of the
Court was said to turn on the effect of the closing of certain public schools, the
majority in Palmer relied upon another factor. This point of distinction was
that in Grifflin the schools were still funded by the county, while in Palmer the
city had removed itself from the business of running of the pools altogether.
After distinguishing Griffin, the Court went on to hold that since the public
pools were closed to both blacks and whites alike, the closing did not violate the
plaintiffs' right to equal protection. It followed that the district and appellate
court decisions denying relief should be affirmed.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE ACTION IN THE DISPOSAL OF
PUBLIC FACILITIES
Because of the difficulty involved in assessing the true motivation behind
any official conduct, the motivation factor seems to be an inadequate criterion
for determining the constitutionality of state action. Thus, the majority in Pal-
mer reasoned forcefully that courts should look primarily at the practical effect
of the disposal of a public facility in order to assess whether a state's action con-
stitutes unlawful discriminatory conduct. The intent of a city or state to dis-
criminate is paled by the actual fact of invidious discrimination. For this reason
the Court in Palmer looked to the effect of closing the public pools rather than
the motivation for the closing. The opinion of the Court was that the closing
affected both blacks and whites equally." Hence, the Court found no violation
of equal protection as a result of the city's action. However, if the closing placed
the city's Negro citizens at a disadvantage, how could the closing be said to
affect blacks and whites equally?
The Court successfully distinguished Griffin from Palmer. Even assuming
the ultimate effect of the closings in both cases to be comparable, the cases may
be distinguished-and without reliance on the motivation criterion. In Griffin
the schools that were closed continued to be financed and run by the state. This
did not happen in Palmer. However, the majority in Palmer did not attempt to
distinguish Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board.' Bush is more difficult to dis-
tinguish in that there the state did not continue to operate the closed facilities
under the guise of private ownership, and the motivation for the closings in
3"The Court also distinguished Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-77 (1967), a
case condemning state sanctioning of private invidious discrimination. In Palm er the district
court found no evidence of state endorsement of private efforts to perpetuate segregation.
The petitioners in Palmr r also argued that the closings violated the thirteenth amend-
ment. The Court discounted as "unpersuasive" the argument that the closings imposed a
badge of slavery. The Court stated that to reach such a result would "severely stretch" the
meaning of the thirteenth amendment. 403 U.S. at 226.
'The Court's observation that the effect of the closing fell equally upon both black and
white citizens is difficult to rationalize with the fact that one of the pools was reopened and
operated on a segregated basis. See note 2 supra.
"187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
[Vol. 25
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both Bush and Palmer was the same. However, even assuming that motivation
is no longer crucial in demonstrating a violation of equal protection with regard
to the closing of a public facility, the cases still seem analogous. The majority
in Palmer relied heavily upon the notion that both black and white citizens
could no longer use the pools. It followed, for the Court, that the closing was
not in violation of the equal protection clause. However, the closings in Bufh
also meant that schools were closed to all citizens, both black and white. This
fact was evidently not persuasive to the court in Bush, for there the district court
found a violation of equal protection, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Because
no such violation was found in Palmer the cases seem irreconcilable. Indeed, it
may be argued that the facts in Palmer make out an even better case for demon-
strating a violation of equal protection. In Bush certain schools were closed to
persons of both races, and evidently those schools remained closed. In Palmer at
least one of the pools was reopened by a private concern and operated on a
segregated basis. Hence, the ultimate effect in Palmer was the perpetuation of
segregation in the very same facility that was closed.
Of all the previously discussed cases dealing with the closing of public facili-
ties, none seems more analogous to Palmer than Wright v. City of Brighton."
Although the opinion in Wright was not rendered by the United States Su-
preme Court, its facts are much like those in Palmer." Wright involved a sale
by the state of a particular school to persons who intended to operate the school
on a segregated basis. In analyzing the effect of the sale, the court held that the
state's action encourages racial segregation and was, therefore, unlawful. Palmer
appears indistinguishable from Wright in the following respect. In Palmer the
closing of one of the public pools and its return to its owners, private persons
whom the city knew would operate the pools on a segregated basis, seems no
less state encouragement of segregation than the court found in Wright." How-
ever, two possible points of distinction deserve attention. In Wright the city
wished to sell a public school. The disposal of one of the pools in Palmer was
effectuated by the city's cancellation of its lease of the pool. Thus, perhaps some
distinction can be drawn between the closing and selling of a city's facilities and
a city's failure to renew its lease of public facilities. The second possible dis-
tinguishing factor is that Palmer involved the closing of swimming pools,
whereas both Bush and Wright involved the closing of public schools. Yet, this
is a somewhat questionable distinction in that the Supreme Court has not held
public education to be a fundamental right." Hence, any distinction between
86441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971).
" Admittedly, the Court could not possibly have considered Wright in disposing of
Palmer since Wright was not considered by the court of appeals until after the opinion in
Palmer had been rendered.
3 Interestingly, in Wright the court purported to distinguish Palmer by demonstrating
that the pools in Palmer were closed to all, while in Wright the school would eventually
be open only to white children. This is a somewhat questionable distinction since a dissent-
ing opinion in Palmer points out that one of the pools closed by the city was then being
operated by private persons on a segregated basis. 403 U.S. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).
" In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), how-
ever, the Supreme Court of California held that the right to public education is a funda-
mental right.
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